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REVIEW ESSAYS
the netherworld of geopolitics
George Michael
The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer “Educated” 
Hitler and Hess, by Holger H� Herwig� Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2016� 292 pages� $85�
Over the past several years, the field of geopolitics has regained popularity� 
More and more, scholars show an interest in the impact of geography on in-
ternational relations and political development� In his book The Revenge of 
Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against 
Fate (Random House, 2013), Robert Kaplan explains how factors such as ter-
rain, rivers, and weather have influenced the destiny of nations� In Russia, the 
political theorist Aleksandr Dugin counsels his nation’s leaders to adopt a geo-
political strategy to counter the U�S�-led world order� He draws on not only the 
rich Anglo-Saxon school of geopolitics but the more obscure German tradition 
as well� While the former is widely available to the English-speaking world, the 
latter is more difficult to access� But Holger H� Herwig, professor emeritus at the 
University of Calgary, has written an important 
book that examines arguably the most impor-
tant figure in the German school of geopolitics: 
the enigmatic Karl Haushofer (1869–1946)� 
Now, for the first time, an extensive English- 
language treatment of Haushofer is available� In 
The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer 
“Educated” Hitler and Hess, Herwig examines how 
Haushofer’s theories influenced German strategy 
in the years leading up to World War II�
George Michael received his PhD from George Ma-
son University’s School of Public Policy. He is an 
associate professor of criminal justice at Westfield 
State University, in Massachusetts. Previously he 
was an associate professor of nuclear counterprolif-
eration and deterrence theory at the Air War College 
in Montgomery, Alabama. He is the author of seven 
books, most recently Preparing for Contact: When 
Humans and Extraterrestrials Finally Meet (RVP 
Press, 2014). In addition, his articles have been pub-
lished in numerous academic journals. 
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The book is structured as a biography that cogently explains how Haushofer’s 
strategic weltanschauung (worldview) evolved over time� Herwig has carried 
out extensive archival research� Haushofer’s roots trace to Bavaria, where he was 
raised in a Catholic family� As a young man, he entered the Kriegsschule (Military 
College), passed his officer’s examination in 1889, and received a commission 
as a second lieutenant� Showing leadership potential, he was admitted to the 
prestigious Kriegsakademie (War Academy) just two years later, and excelled� In 
1904, he took up a three-year post as instructor of modern military history at the 
Bavarian War Academy�
Through his father, Haushofer met Professor Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), 
an ardent pan-Germanist and theoretician of geopolitics� Ratzel’s opus Political 
Geography had an abiding influence on Haushofer’s strategic outlook� Accord-
ing to Ratzel, geography and ethnography were the engines of world history� For 
that reason, educating Germany in the discipline of geopolitics was essential to 
long-term survival, in that nations declined to the degree they were unable to 
understand the necessity of expanding into new territories�
But it was in the Anglo-Saxon world that the field of geopolitics first gained 
broad currency� The English academic Sir Halford Mackinder (1861–1947) is re-
garded as the founder of the discipline� His noted 1904 article “The Geographical 
Pivot of History” exerted a great influence on Haushofer� For Mackinder, control 
of the area that corresponds roughly to Russia, Iran, and the central Asian repub-
lics (i�e�, the “pivot” or “heartland”), is necessary for attaining global hegemony� 
Ominously, Mackinder feared that someday Germany, with its dynamic industry, 
technology, and scientific knowledge, would be grafted onto the vast land and 
natural resources of Russia� A Russo-German alliance would dominate the heart-
land and, by extension, the world�
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), who went on to serve as Presi-
dent of the Naval War College, came to be regarded as geopolitics’ principal 
American proponent� For Mahan, securing vital sea-lanes was the foremost fac-
tor in achieving and maintaining national greatness� After World War I, Haus-
hofer integrated Mahan’s theories on sea power with his continental-oriented 
strategy of geopolitics�
Finally, Haushofer was influenced deeply by Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), a 
Swedish political scientist whose book The State as a Living Organism stressed the 
importance of “human geography�” To Kjellén, the state was not unlike a biologi-
cal being� He invented the word autarky, or national self-sufficiency, which he 
believed was a requisite for attaining global power� Kjellén also coined the term 
Geopolitik, which Haushofer adopted for his own strategic approach�
Events in Haushofer’s personal life created new opportunities for him to refine 
his geopolitical perspective� For example, the woman he would marry, Martha 
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Mechtild Mary Mayer-Doss, had command of multiple languages, including a 
working knowledge of Japanese—a major asset to both� In 1908, the War Min-
istry ordered Haushofer to the German embassy in Tokyo� Haushofer’s stay in 
Japan proved to be an important formative period of his life�
Although they were located on opposite sides of the globe, Haushofer believed 
that Germany and Japan exhibited similar cultures� For example, the samurai 
tradition was not unlike that of the Junker military class, stressing discipline, 
monarchism, and a strong state� Consequently, he contemplated a strategic 
partnership between the two nations as a way to counter American and British 
influence, both economic and political, in the Far East�
Published in 1913, Haushofer’s book Dai Nihon (Great Japan) received favor-
able reviews� In it, Haushofer outlined his basic weltanschauung� He advanced a 
doctrine of social Darwinism, counseling that nations rose and fell according to 
unalterable biological laws� An unabashed imperialist, he exhorted Germany to 
expand into its border areas, as Japan had done in 1894–95 and 1904–1905�
When World War I broke out, Haushofer was given command of a battal-
ion of the 1st Ammunition Column, 7th Army Corps� During quiet periods at 
the front, he gave much thought to the political side of the war, and concluded 
that Germany had entered the conflict alongside the wrong ally, the moribund 
Austria-Hungary� As he saw it, Germany was fighting its two “natural allies” in 
Russia and Japan, with whom it should be united as part of the heartland of which 
he dreamed� When the United States entered the conflict in April of 1917, his 
anti-Americanism became more acute; he wrote that “Americans are truly the 
only people on this world that I regard with a deep, instinctive hatred�” With the 
U�S� military now in the war, the forces arrayed against Germany could not be 
surmounted� But many Germans found it difficult to accept that they had been 
defeated by superior military force; consequently, a “stab in the back” narrative 
crystallized that blamed imperial Germany’s downfall on internal enemies�
By the end of the war, Haushofer had attained the rank of colonel and was 
commanding the 30th Bavarian Reserve Division� In the chaos that followed the 
armistice, he restored order in Bavaria� Returning to Munich, he affiliated with 
the Thule Society, a study group formed in 1911 that was devoted to ancient 
German history� In the realm of politics, the organization had a leading role in 
squelching the leftist revolution led by Kurt Eisner in the spring of 1919� In an 
effort to win the support of the masses, the Thule Society launched the German 
Workers’ Party (DAP) in 1919� That same year, an obscure army corporal investi-
gating nationalist groups attended a meeting of the fledgling political party� Adolf 
Hitler eventually would assume its leadership and change its name to the Nation-
al Socialist German Workers’ Party—which came to be known as the Nazi Party�
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Not long after the war ended, Haushofer returned to academia, teaching at the 
Institute of Geography at the University of Munich� Eventually, he made a sober 
analysis of the reasons Germany was defeated in World War I� In his estimation, 
Germany’s leadership had failed to grasp geopolitics� The experience of World 
War I refined Haushofer’s views on sea power� He adopted Mahan’s precondi-
tions for sea power in his own theory of geopolitics� In his 1937 book World Seas 
and World Powers, Haushofer overcame his narrow continental viewpoint and 
sought to educate Germans on the subjects of commerce, colonies, sea-lanes, 
and oceanic trade� As Herwig points out, Haushofer’s foreign policy views were a 
blend of romanticism and realpolitik� Increasingly, he adopted the verbiage of the 
primacy of race and its influence on history� By 1930, he had established himself 
as Germany’s preeminent apostle of geopolitics�
At the university, Haushofer’s most cherished student was Rudolf Hess (1894–
1987)� They first met at a DAP meeting in May 1920 held in Munich� After the 
failed Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923, Hess was sent to the Landsberg Prison 
along with his coconspirator Adolf Hitler� Through his pupil Hess, Haushofer 
influenced Hitler early in his political career� While in prison, Hitler fleshed out 
the material that eventually became his autobiography and political opus, Mein 
Kampf� In particular, Hitler was influenced by Haushofer’s notion of Lebensraum 
(living room), which left a substantial imprint on his weltanschauung� The den-
sity of the German population cried out for territorial expansion, most especially 
into the broad expanses of Ukraine and Russia�
After the Nazi Machtergreifung (seizure of power) in January 1933, Haushofer 
hoped that Hitler would implement his geopolitical vision� On the foreign policy 
front—at least in the east—Haushofer was at first quite pleased with Hitler� The 
German-Soviet pact of 1939 appeared to be the quintessence of statecraft, in that 
it ignored ideology in favor of pursuing national interests� According to the secret 
protocol signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, Germany 
and the Soviet Union would divide Poland along the Vistula, San, and Bug Rivers, 
while Berlin recognized Moscow’s claims to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania� With a single stroke of the pen, the pact seemed to bring Mac-
kinder’s geographical pivot of history one step closer to fruition� Haushofer was 
ecstatic over the treaty� With Russia as an ally, Germany would gain spatial mass, 
access to vast natural resources, and hinterland security� Furthermore, Hitler’s 
alliance with Japan seemed to be in lockstep with Haushofer’s grand strategy as 
well� Joined with Japan—whose navy was formidable in the Pacific—Germany 
would be virtually unassailable, never again subjected to “Anglo-Saxon tutelage�”
At least initially, the treaty seemed to fend off the strategic nightmare of an-
other two-front war on the continent� Much to Hitler’s dismay, however, Moscow 
evinced little interest in turning south to focus on the British colonies of India 
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and Persia� Instead, by late 1940, Molotov pressed Hitler on his intentions in Fin-
land, Romania, the Balkans, and the Baltic� Feeling rebuffed, Hitler signed War 
Directive No� 21 (Case BARBAROSSA), whose objective was to crush the Soviet 
Union in a rapid campaign� Initiated on June 22, 1941, the invasion effectively 
destroyed Haushofer’s dream of creating a “Eurasian continental block�”
The Western Allies’ successful operation at Normandy doomed the Third 
Reich� Haushofer was arrested not long after the July 20, 1944, plot to assassinate 
Hitler—Operation VALKYRIE—after it transpired that his son Albrecht was as-
sociated with the conspirators� Karl Haushofer was released a month later, most 
likely owing to the intervention of General Franz Ritter von Epp, but the Gestapo 
later killed Albrecht Haushofer�
Not long after Germany’s surrender, the International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg included Haushofer on its list of major war criminals; Chief Justice 
Robert H� Jackson went so far as to refer to him as “Hitler’s intellectual godfather�” 
But ultimately Justice Jackson spared Haushofer by failing to arraign him, and af-
ter interrogation Haushofer was allowed to return home� But by this time he was 
a broken man� Bereaved by the death of his favorite son, he lost all desire to carry 
on� On March 10, 1946, he and his wife committed double suicide by poisoning�
According to Herwig, Haushofer was blinded by a false sense of pride� As Her-
wig points out, the ultimate tragedy of Haushofer’s life, as his son Albrecht noted, 
was that he “broke away the seal” to the Aladdin’s lamp of geopolitics for Hess and 
Hitler and then “let the demon soar into the world�” Haushofer found an eager 
pupil in Hitler, but did not appreciate adequately how his geopolitical concepts 
could be misused in a country that harbored an acute sense of grievance and 
revanchist aspirations after the humiliating Treaty of Versailles� Herwig’s study 
illuminates the tragic story of Haushofer, and as such will be of great interest to 
students of geopolitics�
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Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s 
Trap?, by Graham Allison. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Har-
court, 2017. 384 pages. $28.
Thucydides was a political pathologist, a student of political disease, especially 
as it occurs during war. This is most evident from his account of the plague in 
Athens. He describes the physical symptoms of the disease first, but then turns 
to its political effects, including the breakdown of the Athenian political order 
(Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.47–55). Thucydides’s self-
understanding as a political pathologist is also evident in his account of the civil 
war in Corcyra. He begins with just the facts: the Corinthians inserted a fifth 
column into Corcyra to incite a revolution, in which the oligarchic faction would 
overthrow the democracy. The quarrel polarized the community and escalated to 
a struggle of extermination—while the Athenians watched, callously, from their 
ships at the port in Corcyra. War is a harsh teacher that reduces most of us to the 
necessities that war imposes on us, Thucydides said, so no means, fair or foul, 
were off-limits during this civil war (3.70–85).
Human beings cannot help being moral creatures, however, so the different 
factions had to justify their atrocities to themselves and their followers. In the 
process, words began to lose their customary meaning. Anticipating George Or-
well’s famous account of “doublespeak,” Thucydides showed the worst of the dis-
ease to be a breakdown of moral, political, and strategic judgment, with murder 
described as justice and crime as virtue. The 
desire for revenge was so powerful that it over-
came the drive for self-preservation (3.82). 
The civil war was suicidal; alas, it spread to 
almost every city in ancient Greece, including 
Athens, and contributed to Athens’s ultimate 
defeat at the hands of Sparta.
Little distinguishes Thucydidean from 
modern political science more than Thucydi-
des’s disdain for rational-actor models of 
politics and war. His greatest contribution 
may have been to explain the power of the 
Karl F. Walling has written frequently on Thucydides, 
strategy, and grand strategy. He is also the author of 
Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War 
and Free Government (Univ. Press of Kansas, 1999) 
and coeditor, with Bradford A. Lee, of Strategic Log-
ic and Political Rationality (Routledge, 2003). He 
has taught for the Naval War College for seventeen 
years, first in Newport, Rhode Island, later in Mon-
terey, California. His current book project is Politi-
cal Science and Political Medicine: Thucydides, the 
Federalist Papers, and the Future of Liberal World 
Order.
© 2017 by Karl F. Walling
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irrational passions when violence is a constant threat� If the civil war in Corcyra 
is treated as a microcosm of the struggle between democratic and oligarchic cities 
in ancient Greece, it is an apt description of how belligerents under the pressures 
of war often lose their minds�
The civil war in Corcyra is just one of the many traps against which Dr� 
Thucydides warns us� As a pathologist he diagnoses symptoms of diseases; 
sometimes he explains their causes; occasionally he makes predictions, or prog-
noses, about the likely progress of the disease at hand� He almost never offers 
prescriptions to cure the diseases he identifies, however� He expected the same 
sort of pathologies to arise again and again, so long as human nature remained 
the same (1�22)� He had a cyclical view of history� His answer to the question in 
the 1960s folk-rock anthemic lyrics—“When will they ever learn?”—almost cer-
tainly would have been “They never will�” Individual cities and countries might 
fare better or worse from time to time; some might resist the temptations, even 
compulsions, that lead to mutually suicidal wars; but wisdom is not cumulative� 
As one generation learns from the suffering of war, another forgets� So we are 
condemned to go through this cycle without end�
In contrast, much of modern political science is Whiggish; that is, it embraces a 
progressive view of history� If one treats Thucydides’s greatest translator, Thomas 
Hobbes, as the founder of this kind of political science, the genre certainly shares 
Thucydides’s concern with political pathology� It too diagnoses diseases (such 
as Hobbes’s famous state of nature as a state of war—a beginning point modeled 
clearly on Thucydides’s account of the civil war in Corcyra)� It too tries to explain 
causes and make predictions� But it does one thing Thucydides does not: it offers 
prescriptions� The first to explore in a systematic fashion the possibility of escap-
ing Thucydides’s many traps was Hobbes himself� Henceforward, the purpose 
of political science would be to escape the Thucydides-inspired Hobbesian state 
of nature as a state of war, although Hobbes admitted that this was possible only 
within a political community, not among them� So, the nature of international 
politics, as was true in Thucydides’s age too, was characterized by a state of war�
Others were more optimistic� Take, for example, Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, and John Jay in the classic American work on federalism, republican-
ism, and constitutional government, the Federalist Papers� Although Thucydides 
is never mentioned in the text, his shadow hangs over the entire project, begin-
ning with Jay’s and Hamilton’s accounts of the causes of war and the problems 
of federations in ensuring peace among their members and with other powers 
(essays 3–9, 11, and 15)� The pathology they feared was that the American union 
would become like the Athenian-led Delian League, a tyranny of one state over 
the others, or would descend into anarchy among its members as foreign pow-
ers exploited their internal divisions, as happened to the Delian League when 
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Persia intervened at the end of the Peloponnesian War� And just as Thucydides 
attributed the downfall of Athens to the rise of demagogues, such as Cleon and 
Alcibiades, and the hyperpartisanship they exploited to serve their ambition 
(2�65), James Madison is famous for diagnosing partisan faction as the “disease” 
that commonly destroys free governments from within (essays 10 and 51)� Again, 
human nature is the crucial constant� Eschewing almost all hope of curing the 
causes of faction in a free government, Dr� Madison advised treating its effects, 
or symptoms, in an extended republic whose pluralistic character would make it 
difficult for any one faction to tyrannize in its own name�
And others were even more optimistic about escaping Thucydides’s multiple 
traps—the constant dangers of war and tyranny arising from, and aggravated 
by, the wildest passions of human nature� Immanuel Kant famously argued that 
republican (law-based) government is possible even for a nation of devils, if they 
have but reason� And if that was possible inside a state, it also might be possible 
among them, if they established something like a League of Nations or a United 
Nations to provide collective security� Friedrich Hegel even predicted an end 
of history, in which the world spirit would transform human nature and put an 
end to violent conflict� And at the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama even 
claimed that, inside the West at least, the Hegelian end of history had arrived� 
Humanity soon might escape Thucydides’s many, many traps�
Not so fast, some argued� History might return, perhaps with a vengeance� 
And so it did in the Balkans, Iraq, and Syria today, where every political disease 
Thucydides predicted would happen in civil war has recurred, but with the sav-
age advantages of modern weaponry�
Now entering the fray comes Graham Allison in his latest book, Destined for 
War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, which is based on an 
earlier, provocative article in The Atlantic (September 24, 2015)� Those familiar 
with Allison’s distinguished body of scholarship know his question is rhetorical� 
Whether writing on the Cuban missile crisis or the dangers of nuclear terrorism, 
he always has combined a Thucydidean anticipation of recurring problems, such 
as military escalation, with a progressive aspiration to solve them, so far as they 
can be solved, at least in our own time� Precisely because the problems are rooted 
in human nature, they will never go away; they will increase or decrease in inten-
sity depending on the political conditions of the age� They might be mitigated, 
however, by anticipating them and avoiding some of the errors in judgment that 
led to calamities in the past�
The calamity Allison fears most is what he calls the “Thucydides Trap”: a 
situation in which a rising power’s growth inspires such fear in an established 
power that it seems, inevitably, to lead to war (p� xv)� To be clear, this is just one 
of many traps, or pathologies, Thucydides first diagnosed, but he did claim that 
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the “truest cause” of the Peloponnesian War was the growth of Athenian power 
and the fear it inspired in Sparta, which compelled Sparta to go to war (1�23, 1�88, 
1�118)� Scholars differ on how precisely to translate and interpret Thucydides’s 
understanding of the truest cause of the war� Did Thucydides mean the war was 
inevitable, and if so, what kind of inevitability was he talking about?
One might argue that even Thucydides did not believe in the Thucydides 
Trap as Allison defines it� What appears to be a clear and simple explanation of 
the causes of the Peloponnesian War is anything but� Wrote Carl Clausewitz, war 
arises from a clash of policies� If Athens insisted on challenging Sparta’s power 
and if Sparta insisted on containing Athens, then yes, some form of conflict was 
inevitable� But these policies were not inevitable� Athens might have chosen not 
to try to expand its power further; Sparta might have chosen to accommodate 
Athenian aspirations; some sort of compromise might have been possible if they 
had made different political choices�
And here Greek tragedy, which was born shortly before and flourished most 
during the Peloponnesian War, can be helpful� Was Oedipus (whose hubris 
during a plague reminds some of Pericles) destined to kill his father and sleep 
with his mother? Sophocles’s play Antigone is set after a terrible civil war—not 
unlike the one in Corcyra� Were Antigone and Creon destined to fight, and suf-
fer, over their different views of the demands of political authority and religious 
conscience? Yes and no� Tragic inevitability is a result of both circumstance and 
character� There would have been no tragedy if Oedipus were not Oedipus or 
Antigone not Antigone� Oedipus was the kind of arrogant character who would 
make the sort of judgments that brought about his reversal of fortune, and Antig-
one and Creon were the sorts of self-righteous characters who would allow their 
conflict to polarize unto death�
Likewise, in international politics, as Thucydides well knew and Allison’s book 
confirms, geopolitical circumstance is not destiny; the characters of potential 
belligerents matter, especially their willingness and ability to compromise� As 
Allison demonstrates, England was so fearful of the rise of Germany that it found 
ways to accommodate two other rising challengers, the United States and Japan, 
prior to the First World War, and avoided a war with them as a result (p� 85)� So 
not all rising and established powers are destined to go to war with each other, 
but, as Allison also shows, it is difficult to see how hubristic ones like Athens 
and paranoid ones like Sparta can avoid it� Their national characters fed on each 
other, aggravated their enmities, and made a difficult situation worse, perhaps 
even impossible to resolve without war�
In many ways, Allison is following in Thucydides’s footsteps� The structural 
situation of a rising China challenging the established power of the United States 
has to worry anyone who has seen this problem before� Whereas Thucydides 
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describes a microcosm of all war that is meant to diagnose the recurring pa-
thologies of war as such, Allison’s focus is far narrower, although his dataset is 
far bigger� Allison gathers evidence from sixteen different case studies in which 
the structural features of a clash between a rising and an established power are 
apparent� These range from the Peloponnesian War to the First World War to 
the Cold War� In twelve out of sixteen cases, war has been the result� No one who 
has studied the history of war in the twentieth century and beyond can rest easy 
about this� The First World War destroyed four great empires in Russia, Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman caliphate� It set England and France on a 
path of irrecoverable decline as great powers� And it established conditions for 
totalitarian government to arise in Europe and the Second World War to begin� 
The subsequent clash between the Soviet Union and the United States threatened 
humanity with nuclear extinction� Exactly why the Cold War did not escalate to a 
mutually suicidal war like the Peloponnesian War is not yet clear and is bound to 
be much disputed, but China is rising so quickly, and it has so many people and 
so much wealth, that it seems likely to make the Soviet Union’s challenge to the 
United States pale in comparison�
That does not mean war between the United States and China is inevitable; 
rather, it reveals the imperative to do all that is possible to ensure that it does not 
become so� This is the spirit in which Allison’s book was written and the spirit 
in which it should be received (pp� 235–40)� Thucydides scholars may cavil over 
particular passages Allison cites� China scholars may dispute some of his data� 
And, of course, specialists are bound to question his reading of the sixteen cases 
in his database, as well as why he chose those cases instead of others� Still oth-
ers will warn of the dangers of historical analogies that abstract from the unique 
features of antagonists� Fair enough; but we ought not to lose sight of the forest 
for the trees�
The great question is how to uphold American rights and interests, yet not 
go to war with China (pp� 3–24)� Allison supplies some helpful ways to begin 
to develop an answer� He gives us not a recipe book full of answers but a set of 
questions, or what he calls “clues for peace”—a research agenda, so to speak, for 
the twenty-first century (pp� 187–213)� It belongs to us, students and faculty at 
war colleges especially, to follow the clues—some of which might be false—and 
to develop the answers that fit our time�
Allison does point to some Thucydidean pathologies we would be foolish to 
leave out of our answers, however� One is the tendency toward hubris in many ris-
ing powers and toward paranoia in many established ones� That is a very bad mix� 
He documents the hubris in the character of Kaiser Wilhelm II (and many other 
Germans) and the rise of anti-German sentiment in England on the eve of the 
First World War� He also shows that, ironically, Germany before the First World 
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War feared the rise of Russia just as much as England feared the rise of Germany, 
but with the difference that the Germans developed a strategy of preventive war 
to address the challenge from Russia� They planned to start a war before it was 
too late, just as Sparta opted to go to war with Athens before it was too late to 
resist its growing power (pp� 63–83)� As the cataclysm of the First World War 
demonstrates, the escalation natural to war makes preventive wars opportunities 
well squandered� Starting a war to avoid a war is just too dangerous, especially 
when a rival has nuclear weapons (pp� 207–209)�
This, after all, is one of the key insights of the Athenians in the Melian Dia-
logue� Precisely because Thucydides was a pathologist, modern realists often take 
what Thucydides understood as diseased to be something natural, even healthy, 
like the Athenians’ famous observation that “the strong do what they can while 
the weak suffer what they must” (5�89)� Properly understood, Thucydides was 
diagnosing hubris in the Athenians, not endorsing their example� Of greater sig-
nificance is what the Athenians said immediately before this passage: that justice, 
understood as some form of restraint in international politics, is “only in ques-
tion between equals in power,” or, more literally, between equals in their power 
to compel (through their capability to destroy each other) (5�89)� Perhaps some 
powers are capable of self-restraint absent external compulsion, but the Athe-
nians anticipated what became the cardinal doctrine of the late Cold War: mutual 
assured destruction� Had Athens and Sparta known before their war began that 
it would result in the destruction of the Athenian empire and the irrecoverable 
decline of Sparta, perhaps neither would have gone to war� We know for certain 
and well ahead of time that a war between the United States and China could 
destroy them both� On the basis of that pessimistic premise from the Melian 
Dialogue, perhaps one might begin to build a system of mutual restraint for the 
United States and China�
Those who follow Allison’s path in seeking to avoid Thucydides’s diverse set 
of traps might do well to remember that the American founding was in many 
ways an effort to escape those traps, a practical application of republican secu-
rity theory meant to build a security community in North America in which 
the member states were neither warring nor preparing to war against each 
other� Alas, despite the best hopes of the authors of the Federalist Papers, neither 
demagoguery nor hyperpartisanship has disappeared from politics in Europe or 
America� The Madisonian system of treating the effects rather than the causes of 
faction clearly has its limitations� When combined with nationalist sentiments, 
hyperpartisan demagoguery might get out of control, just as it did in Athens, and 
divide members of the West among themselves, thus producing the sort of inter-
national anarchy an outside power might seek to exploit� Under the influence of 
its demagogues, Athens self-destructed, in part by exploiting its allies, thereby 
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driving them into rebellion� Pericles stated on the eve of the Peloponnesian War 
that Athens had a strong chance of weathering the gathering storm if it retained 
control of the sea and managed its alliances well (2�65)� This is probably true for 
the United States too� So long as it can avoid strategic overextension and lead its 
allies without dominating them, the United States ought to be able to generate 
sufficient loyalty among its allies to deter war while doing everything possible to 
make cooperation in China’s best interest� But woe unto the Americans if they 
undermine, or allow others to jeopardize, the system of alliances on which they 
based their security in the aftermath of the Second World War�
Allison has written an important book, one destined to be debated as much 
as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996)� 
Those who take it as a point of departure might consider therefore a different 
reading of the causes of the Peloponnesian War� What if both Sparta and Athens 
were revisionist powers, with Sparta seeking to revise the structure of power in 
ancient Greece to where it was before the Persian Wars, when Sparta was the 
undisputed hegemon in ancient Greece? Might that analogy fit China today, 
with its young leaders yearning for past hegemony before the European empires 
exploited its internal weaknesses in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries? And what about the United States? On the back of the American dollar bill, 
underneath the pyramid, is a Latin phrase, Novus Ordo Seclorem, “new order of 
the ages�” From its inception, the United States has aimed to be a revolutionary 
power in world affairs, although with much debate on whether the global revolu-
tion would come about from following the American example (what we call soft 
power today) or by force of arms (in crusades for freedom)� After the end of the 
Cold War, when enlargement and engagement became catchwords for American 
foreign policy, one might argue that the United States was anything but a status 
quo power� In time, it chose preventive war in Iraq� And it sought regime change 
elsewhere, too, which must have frightened regimes that Americans had not yet 
sought to change� Small wonder that they push back�
The worst nightmare for the twenty-first century is not one but two revisionist 
powers, China and the United States, each struggling for hegemony� On the eve 
of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles told the Athenians that he was “more afraid 
of our own blunders” than of the Spartans (1�144)� As George Kennan indicated 
long ago, Americans too might become their own worst enemies� While contain-
ing the Soviets, they needed to learn to contain themselves, lest they cause the 
war they meant to prevent� With respect to China, that insight is more relevant 
than ever�
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